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Abstract
We provide an empirical analysis of regional risk sharing in Nor-
way over the period 1977-90. The approach of Asdrubali, Sørensen
and Yosha (1996) is extended to take account of public employment
as a possible shock absorber. The other channels of risk sharing are
capital markets & commuting, taxes & transfers and credit markets.
Surprisingly, there seems to be full interregional risk sharing in the
short run, with public employment absorbing about 20 % of regional
shocks to private output. The combined eﬀect of capital markets
& commuting is even more important, however, absorbing up to 70
% of regional shocks. In the longer run, a significant fraction of re-
gional shocks remain unsmoothed. Government smoothing increases
and market based smoothing decreases as shocks become more per-
manent.
1 Introduction
How much risk sharing is there between nations and between regions within
a country? What are the most important channels for the risk sharing that
takes place? These two questions has been subject to extensive research
in the past few years. The interest in issues relating to risk sharing at the
aggregate level stems partly from the continuing integration of national cap-
ital markets, and partly from the process of monetary integration in Europe.
The possibility of pooling nation specific risks is one of the primary argu-
ments in favor of international financial integration, making it important to
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establish whether and to what extent risk sharing occurs in international
financial markets. This issue is of particular importance for the EMU coun-
tries, since the elimination of a national monetary policy and the current
restrictions on national budget deficits generate a need for other mechanisms
to tackle country specific shocks.
A dominant finding in existing research is that risk sharing between coun-
tries (including the EMU nations) is limited. This is apparent both through
the home country bias in asset portfolios (e.g. French and Poterba, 1991;
Tesar and Werner, 1995), and the low cross national consumption correla-
tions documented by e.g. Obstfeld (1994) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996).
More direct evidence on the limited risk sharing between nations can be
found in B. Sørensen and Yosha (1998).
Existing studies of regional, or intranational, risk sharing indicate that
there is more risk sharing taking place at this level. Asdrubali et al. (1996),
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998), and Mèlitz and Zumer (1999) all
report that the amount of interstate risk sharing in the US is substantial,
and much larger than what is found in international data. Similar results
are reported for Canada by Bayoumi and Klein (1997) and Mèlitz and Zumer
(1999)1, and for Japan by van Wincoop (1995).
An interesting aspect by some of the regional studies, is that they de-
compose the contribution to the reduction in the cross sectional covariance
between output and consumption into diﬀerent channels. These channels can
be divided into two main categories: First, insurance mechanisms inherent in
the policy of the federal government, e.g. the tax-transfer system and grants
to local governments. Second, market transactions that provide regional
insurance via, for instance, cross-ownership of stocks and borrowing/lending
in national credit markets.2 Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Athanasoulis and
van Wincoop (1998) find that interstate risk sharing in the US takes place
dominantly through markets. Using somewhat diﬀerent techniques for mea-
suring, both papers find that the amount of regional market insurance is
about 5 times larger than the cross-state insurance provided by the federal
government.
In this paper we study the amount and channels of interregional risk
sharing in Norway. We argue that the lessons for Europe from the US
studies can be limited because the US has much larger capital markets and
smaller central government budgets relative to the size of the economy. To
1Mèlitz and Zumer (1999) does also report results for Italy and the UK, but, in their
own words, ”..the model performs badly in the UK and Italy...” (p. 181).
2Financial markets are not the only markets where regional shocks can be absorbed.
The labor market does also provide such opportunities through e.g. migration or com-
muting. More on this later.
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learn something about the amount and type of regional insurance one can
achieve in an economy with large governments, we believe that Norway is an
instructive case. Moreover, regional redistribution has been, and continues
to be, an important political aim in Norway. Arguably, even more so than
in other European countries. Hence, our analysis can also be viewed as
an assessment of how successful this policy has been in terms of providing
equal consumption opportunities for the inhabitants in diﬀerent parts of the
nation.
We extend the analysis of Asdrubali et al. (1996) to take account of public
employment as a possible shock absorber. In Norway and other countries,
we believe that regions that experience a bad private sector shock are often
compensated by higher employment in the public sector. In addition to the
approach of Asdrubali et al., we thus also use an alternative approach where
shocks occur in the private sector and where output in the public sector
(public employment) is viewed as a shock absorber.
Surprisingly, our analysis indicate full interregional risk sharing in the
short run. And, public employment is indeed an important channel of re-
gional risk sharing, with 20 % of a shock absorbed by this channel in our
short run analysis. The combined eﬀect of capital market smoothing and
commuting is even more important though, with up to 70 % of a shock ab-
sorbed by this channel in the short run. We would like to stress, however,
that the latter estimate may be upwardly biased due to possible measurement
errors in our data for gross regional product.
In the longer run, measurement errors is less of a concern. Our long
run analysis’ show that a significant fraction of regional shocks remain un-
smoothed. Moreover, federal insurance mechanisms become more important
(with public employment absorbing up to 25 % of a shock), while market
based risk sharing appears to decrease. Transactions in capital markets still
absorbs close to 25 % of a regional shock in our long run analysis, however.
This is lower than the corresponding US estimate in Asdrubali et al. (1996),
but still high enough to reject our a-priori expectation that capital markets
would be relatively unimportant in Norway.
The next section lay out and discuss a simple model of regional risk
sharing. Section 3 reports some important descriptive statistics from the
Norwegian data. In section 4 we discuss and extend the empirical model
of Asdrubali et al. (1996), while section 5 describes our data. Finally, our
results are reported in section 6, and then we conclude in section 7.
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2 The principles and channels of aggregate
risk sharing
Consider a nation consisting of I regions, i = 1, ..I. In each region there is a
representative agent with log utility defined over an aggregate consumption
good and infinite time horizon. In each period t there is a set of possible
states of nature St with elements denoted st. The transition between out-
comes s follows a Markov-process; the probability of outcome st (denoted
π(st)) depends only on the realized value st−1 and possibly on time. Out-
put of the consumption good in region i in period t is denoted yi(st) and is
an exogenous stochastic variable. Let ci(st) be consumption in region i in
period t. If there are no sharing of output risk among the regions we would
have
ci(st) = yi(st), ∀t, s, i.
Thus the ”autarky” solution would imply that consumption would move one-
to-one with gross regional product over time.
The opposite case of autarky is an economy with complete markets. This
means that there exists a national Arrow-Debreu market for the delivery of
the consumption good for each outcome and period. Let p(st) be the price of
a claim on the consumption good with outcome s in period t. Each region’s
intertemporal budget constraint can thus be written as
∞X
t=0
SX
s=1
p(st)yi(st) =
∞X
t=0
SX
s=1
p(st)ci(st), i = 1, .., I (1)
The representative agent in region i maximize
∞X
t=0
βt
SX
s=1
π(st) log ci(st)
subject to (1), and where β is the (common across regions) discount factor.
The first-order conditions are
βtπ(st)
1
ci(st)
− λip(st) = 0, ∀t, s, i, (2)
where λi is a Lagrange multiplier. Market clearing implies that
IX
i=1
yi(st) =
IX
i=1
ci(st), ∀t, s. (3)
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By combining (2) and (3), it can be shown that consumption in region i is
given by
ci(st) = ki
X
i
yi(st), ∀t, s,
where ki is a constant. Thus, in each period every region consumes a constant
fraction of GDP, regardless of the realized state of nature. Consumption
would move one-to-one with gross domestic product over time. When there
is partial risk sharing, regional consumption will depend on gross regional
product as well as GDP.
There are several mechanisms for sharing output risk among regions. A
main distinction is between market transactions and transactions across re-
gions that are implemented by the central government. Market based chan-
nels can, in turn, be split into transactions in financial markets and labor
markets. Risk sharing through labor markets is related to the mobility of
labor. Extensive interregional migration, responding to the slightest shock,
would, for instance, quickly even out small diﬀerences in per capita gross re-
gional product. Likewise, large scale commuting can contribute to separate
regional output growth and consumption growth. We ignore migration as
a potential risk sharing device in our analysis, but attempt to control for
commuting.
Risk sharing through financial markets can occur as cross-border owner-
ship of productive assets (typically stocks) and/or through borrowing and
lending in national credit markets. As opposed to investments in stocks,
credit markets can only provide insurance against transitory shocks (see e.g.
Baxter and Crucini, 1995). We include both potential channels in our anal-
ysis.3
Unless complete insurance can be achieved through markets, the regional
tax-transfer policies of the central government will have an eﬀect on the
degree of risk sharing. This will be the case even if the policies primarily
intends to achieve redistributive goals (Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 1992). In
addition to the tax-transfer system, we also consider public employment as
a possible shock absorber (to private output growth). The motivation for
this is discussed in more detail in section 4.4
3We do not explicitly consider international risk sharing. To the extent that Norwegian
individuals or regions operate in international financial markets, it will occour as a part
of capital markets smoothing in our analysis.
4Notice that we ignore the potential utility smoothing eﬀect of local public goods
provided by the central government. If depressed regions are compensated with more
public goods, we are thus underestimating the risk sharing role of the central government.
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3 A preliminary look at the data
Based on the model in section 2, we would expect to find a high degree
of cross-regional consumption growth correlation in a nation with extensive
regional risk sharing. If, on the other hand, the consumption growth cor-
relations are low, and particularly if they are lower than output correlations
(Backus et al., 1992), it would suggest limited intraregional risk sharing.
In the second column of table 1, we report the correlation coeﬃcients of
changes in annual per capita private consumption (c) between all Norwegian
counties and the nation minus the county in question, over the period 1976-
90.5 These numbers are striking: The consumption growth correlations are
extremely high and concentrated, with a minimum of 0.92 and a maximum
of 0.98. Indeed, this is much higher than found in any similar study we
know of, be that inter- or intranational. The corresponding coeﬃcients for
gross regional product (grp) is reported in the third column. They vary
substantially from county to county, and are lower than the consumption
growth correlations for all counties. In section 6 we will also study to what
extent shocks to private sector output are smoothed. The last column of
table 1 reports correlations between private-sector grp growth in county i
and the rest of the nation. These are similar in magnitude to the total grp
correlations, with a slightly smaller average.
Taking these numbers at face value, the risk sharing implications are
straightforward: The low output correlations suggest that there is a signifi-
cant potential for regional insurance in Norway, and the consumption corre-
lations indicate that this has been achieved to a large extent. But of course,
simple correlation coeﬃcients are insuﬃcient to draw firm conclusions. We
leave that until the econometric analysis below.
[Table 1 approximately here]
Table 2 reports unweighted average correlation coeﬃcients between region
i and the rest of the nation for several economic variables, over the 1977-90
period. The variables are (the growth rates of) the private sector’s share of
gross regional product (grpp), regional income (ri), and disposable regional
income (dri). For the sake of comparison, coeﬃcients for total gross regional
5As consumption data we use annual regional retail sales, complied by Statistics Nor-
way. The same source provided us with data for gross county product for the period
1975-90. We should notice that all output that cannot be sensibly allocated to one of the
ordinary counties (mainly from oﬀshore petroleum extraction an international shipping)
are allocated to an ’Extra region’. As this region plays no role in our empirical analysis in
section 6, output allocated to this region is excluded from national GDP in tables 1 and
2. See section 5 for a detailed description of the data used in this paper.
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product and consumption are also included.6 Notice that we display the
numbers for two levels of aggregation, counties and regions.7
[Table 2 approximately here]
The general pattern is that all variables are positively correlated across
regions. The coeﬃcients are particularly high and concentrated for the
income variables and consumption. Hence, there seems to more idiosyncratic
variation in regional output growth than in regional income growth. This
is also a rough indication that there are indeed risk sharing in some form
between the Norwegian regions.
4 The empirical model
The empirical analysis carried out in this paper is an application and an
extension of the approach of Asdrubali et al. (1996). Their point of departure
is the following identity
grp =
grp
ri
ri
dri
dri
c
c
where grp is gross regional product, ri is regional income, dri is disposable
regional income and c is regional consumption. Regional income includes
wages, dividend and interest, whereas disposable regional income includes
(federal) taxes and transfers. All variables are measured per capita. By
taking logs and diﬀerences, multiplying both sides with∆ log(grp) and taking
expectations, the following decomposition of the variance in gross regional
product can be obtained:
var {∆ log(grp)} = cov {∆ log(grp),∆ log(grp)−∆ log(ri)}
+cov {∆ log(grp),∆ log(ri)−∆ log(dri)}
+cov {∆ log(grp),∆ log(dri)−∆ log(c)}
+cov {∆ log(grp),∆ log(c)}
6Notice that table 2 is based on growth rates over the period 1977-90, while table 1 was
for 1976-90. Our income data is available only from 1976 (giving us growth rates from
1977), and so we report numbers from this period in table 2.
7There are five regions, aggregated from counties as follows: East : Østfold, Akershus,
Oslo, Hedmark, Oppland, Buskerud, Vestfold, Telemark; South: V-Agder, A-Agder, Ro-
galand;West : Hordaland, Sogn & Fj., Møre & R.; Mid : S-Trøndelag, N-Trøndelag; North:
Nordland, Troms, Finnmark. This is the same regional classification as used by Statisitics
Norway in oﬃcial regional statistics.
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Finally, the above equation is divided by the variance of ∆ log(grp) to get
1 = βK + βF + βC + βU
where βK is the fraction of a shock that is smoothed through capital markets,
βF the fraction that is smoothed by (federal) taxes and transfers, βC the
fraction that is smoothed through credit markets, and βU the fraction that
is not smoothed.
Asdrubali et al. (1996) estimate the β’s by running the following panel
regressions
∆ log(grpi,t)−∆ log(rii,t) = αKt + βK∆ log(grpi,t) + uKi,t
∆ log(rii,t)−∆ log(drii,t) = αFt + βF∆ log(grpi,t) + uFi,t
∆ log(drii,t)−∆ log(ci,t) = αCt + βC∆ log(grpi,t) + uci,t
∆ log(ci,t) = αUt + βU∆ log(grpi,t) + uUi,t
where the α’s are time specific constant terms and the u’s are error terms.
The subscript i, t denotes region i in year t. The inclusion of time dummies
implies that the β-estimates are unaﬀected by shocks that are common to
all regions. The estimated β’s sum to 1, but each β is not constrained to be
positive or less than 1.
As mentioned above, the amount of smoothing that takes place through
the diﬀerent channels increases with the value of β. The intuition can be ex-
plained in the following way: If full risk sharing is achieved through capital
markets, regional income will not comove with gross regional product, and
βK will be equal to unity. On the other hand, if no risk sharing is achieved
through capital markets, regional income growth coincides with the growth in
gross regional product, and βK equals zero. If full risk sharing is not achieved
through capital markets, there is further scope for risk sharing through taxes
and transfers. Risk sharing through taxes and transfers is achieved if the
comovement between regional income and regional gross product is stronger
than the comovement between disposable regional income and regional gross
product, which will show up as a positive βF . Finally, risk sharing is achieved
through credit markets if the comovement between disposable regional in-
come and gross regional product is stronger than the comovement between
consumption and gross regional product.
Within the approach of Asdrubali et al. (1996) shocks are related to gross
regional product, and they do not separate between the private and the pub-
lic sector. In the Norwegian context it may be more productive to use a
more narrow definition of shocks since public employment is an important
instrument in the national government’s regional policy. Regions that are
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hit by negative private output shocks are typically compensated by higher
employment in the public sector. The expansion of public employment is fa-
cilitated by grants to local and county governments, and by locating national
government agencies in regions with slow growth in the private sector.
In addition to the approach of Asdrubali et al., we use an alternative
approach where shocks are related to gross regional product in the private
sector and where gross regional product in the public sector (public employ-
ment) is treated as a shock absorber. Within the alternative approach, the
point of departure is the following identity
grp_pr =
grp_pr
grp
grp
ri
ri
dri
dri
c
c
where grp_pr denotes gross regional product in the private sector. The panel
regressions to be estimated are as follows
∆ log(grp_pri,t)−∆ log(grpi,t) = αPt + βP∆ log(grp_pri,t) + uPi,t
∆ log(grpi,t)−∆ log(rii,t) = αKt + βK∆ log(grp_pri,t) + uKi,t
∆ log(rii,t)−∆ log(drii,t) = αFt + βF∆ log(grp_pri,t) + uFi,t
∆ log(drii,t)−∆ log(ci,t) = αCt + βC∆ log(grp_prit,) + uci,t
∆ log(ci,t) = αUt + βU∆ log(grp_pri,t) + uUi,t
where βP is the fraction of a shock that is smoothed through public employ-
ment.
5 Data
Statistics Norway provided us with data on gross county product for the 19
counties, over the period 1973-90.8 A documentation on how these data are
constructed can be found in K. Sørensen (1994).
The starting point for calculating regional income is taxable income from
the Tax Statistics. Taxable income includes wages, pensions and other so-
cial security benefits, interest and dividend, less of deductions (e.g. interest
payments). For our purpose, regional income should be defined as taxable
income less of pensions and other social security benefits provided by the
federal government. Hence, we have deducted pensions, unemployment ben-
efits, disability benefits and medical benefits from taxable income to arrive
8We us only the time span 1976-90 since income data are unavilable prior to 1976.
Likewise, we do have data on gross county product for 1992 and 1993, but not for 1991.
We have chosen to analyze only the period for which we have a continous series.
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at regional income. Disposable regional income is simply taxable income
minus taxes, i.e. regional income net of taxes and transfers. Taxes includes
income and wealth taxes to local, county and national government.
The Tax Statistics is based on place of residence, i.e. wage income is
assigned to the region where the employees live, and not necessarily to the
region where they work. As a consequence, what we labeled capital market
smoothing in the previous section will also include smoothing through com-
muting between regions. Below, we attempt to control for commuting by
analyzing data at two levels of aggregation, county and regional. Commuting
between regions is much less widespread than between counties.
The consumption figures are collected from the Wholesale and Retail
Trade Statistics, and retail sales are used as a proxy for consumption. Both
durable and nondurable consumption goods are included.
The empirical analysis is based on data for the period 1976-1990 (giving
growth rates from 1977), and is carried out at two levels of aggregation. The
lowest level is the county level and the highest is the regional level. There are
19 counties and 5 regions. In 1990 the population size of the counties varied
from 75 000 to 460 000, whereas the population size of the regions varied
from 375 000 to 2 000 000. We think it is informative to do the analysis at
two levels of aggregation, particularly because commuting and cross border
shopping is more widespread at the county level than at the regional level.
The definition and construction of the variables largely follows Asdrubali
et al. (1996). The main diﬀerences are the definition of consumption and
the treatment of subnational governments. The consumption measure of
Asdrubali et al. includes both private and state and local government con-
sumption, whereas we, as Melitz and Zumer (1999) in their analyses of Italy
and the UK, only include private consumption. As a consequence, grants and
taxes to subnational governments are not included in disposable regional in-
come. The more narrow definition of consumption is motivated by the
Norwegian institutional context where local and county governments have
very limited tax discretion. In principle they can choose tax rates within
an interval, but during the period under study they have all used the max-
imum rate. We think it is less productive to analyze the total of private
and subnational government consumption in a situation where subnational
governments are unable to transfer resources between the private and the
public sectors.
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6 Results
We start out by presenting the results for the two levels of aggregation and
with the approach of Asdrubali et al. and our extended approach. These
results are displayed in Table 3, where the equations are estimated with OLS.
Analyses at the county level with the Asdrubali et al. approach indicate that
there is full risk sharing and that most of the smoothing (94%) takes place
through capital markets / commuting. Credit markets accounts for nearly 5%
and taxes & transfers for a mere 1.5%. Our estimates are quite diﬀerent from
those of Asdrubali et al. (1996) for the US states. They find 39% smoothing
through capital markets, 13% through (federal) taxes and transfers, 23%
through credit markets, and that 25% of a shock remains unsmoothed. One
might suspect that commuting and cross border shopping explains our high
estimate of smoothing through capital markets / commuting and the low
estimate of non-smoothing. Similar analysis at the regional level, where
commuting and cross border shopping are less widespread, does not support
this hypothesis as the results based on regional level data is very similar to
those based on county level data. At both levels of aggregation there is no
evidence of non-smoothing and nearly 90% smoothing is achieved through
capital markets / commuting. However, compared to the analysis at the
county level, the regional level analysis indicates that taxes & transfers and
credit markets are more important channels of risk sharing.
[Table 3 approximately here]
The extended approach documents that public employment is an impor-
tant channel of risk sharing. The amount of smoothing through public
employment is 17% when the model is estimated at the county level and
nearly 20% when the model is estimated at the regional level. Still, a sub-
stantial part of smoothing (70% or more) takes place through capital markets
/ commuting and the total amount of smoothing is roughly 100%.
The results discussed so far are based on simple OLS regressions. As-
drubali et al. (1996) use a slightly diﬀerent estimation technique where they
correct for heteroskedasticity and estimate the equations as a system in the
second step. The results from using their estimation method are reported in
Table A1 of the Appendix. The ’consumption equation’ is left of the esti-
mation and βU is calculated based on the estimates of the other β0s and the
identity that the sum of the β0s equals unity. It appears that the estimates
using the method of Asdrubali et al. is very similar to the estimates reported
in Table 3. At the county level the diﬀerence between the two methods is al-
ways less than 1 %-points. The diﬀerence are somewhat larger at the regional
level (2-3 %-points).
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Mélitz and Zumer (1999) propose another estimation method in a study
where they reestimate the model of Asdrubali et al. (using their data) and the
extends the analysis to Canada, UK, Italy and a panel data set of 23 OECD
countries. Their estimation method diﬀers from that of Asdrubali et al. in
two ways. First, they remove the time dummies from the model and include
a set of controls. The main purpose is to increase the degrees of freedom. The
controls capture the regional business cycle, regional size, the real interest
rate and an index of persistence (Campbell and Mankiw, 1987). Second,
they introduce a predetermined value of βU by calculating the variance of
consumption and dividing by the variance of output every year and then
taking the average over all years. The argument for this approach goes as
follows (p. 161): ”If movements in regional consumption stem exclusively
from movements in regional output, as the model says, then any lower cross-
sectional variance of regional consumption than cross-sectional variation of
regional output must reflect smoothing.” The results from using the method
of Mélitz and Zumer are reported in Table A2 of the Appendix. It appears
that the amount of a shock that remains unsmoothed is not much aﬀected.
It is first and foremost the composition of market based smoothing that
changes. The amount of smoothing through capital markets / commuting
is even higher than in Table 1, whereas smoothing through credit markets
becomes negative and in the order of 10-35%. We find these estimates rather
implausible, and given that the OLS estimates are very similar those obtained
by using the method of Asdrubali et al., we rely on OLS in the following.
In any case, the impression from the analysis so far is that, compared to
other countries, Norway seem to have an extremely high degree of regional
risk sharing and with capital markets & commuting as the dominating chan-
nel of risk sharing. The results basically reflect that the annual correlation
between the growth of gross regional product and the growth of regional in-
come is fairly low. The average of the annual correlations is 0.20 between
regional income growth and the growth of private gross regional product,
and 0.14 between regional income growth and total gross regional product.
Moreover, consumption growth is practically uncorrelated with the growth
of private and total gross regional product (correlation coeﬃcients of 0.04
and 0.01), and only weakly correlated with regional income and disposable
regional income (correlation coeﬃcients of 0.22 and 0.18).
We are somewhat concerned, however, that these low correlations may
to some extent reflect measurement error in the figures for gross regional
product. We expect that such measurement error is more serious in the short
term than in the longer term. Hence, it is useful to repeat the analysis’ above
using a longer diﬀerencing interval. This also provide an indication of which
of the risk sharing mechanisms are better suited for smoothing permanent
12
shocks.
[Table 4 approximately here]
In Table 4 we investigate whether the amount of smoothing and its com-
position are aﬀected by the frequency of the data used in the regressions
(county level). When k=2, the diﬀerencing interval is 2 years and the data
set includes the growth rates for the periods 1976-78, 1977-79, ..., 1988-90.
The total amount of smoothing decreases as the frequency of the data in-
creases. For k=5 the total amount of smoothing is about 80%, compared
to 100% for k=1. Government smoothing (public employment and taxes &
transfers) increases as the diﬀerencing interval increases, whereas the oppo-
site is the case for the market based channels (capital markets / commuting
and credit markets).
[Table 5 approximately here]
Analyses at the regional with diﬀerent frequencies of the data are re-
ported in Table 5. In some respects, the results are similar to those at the
county level: As the diﬀerencing interval increases, government smoothing
increases and market based smoothing decreases. Moreover, total smoothing
is reduced as the drop in market based smoothing is larger than the increase
in government smoothing. The finding that total smoothing decreases as
shocks become more permanent is in line with Asdrubali et al. (1996). Also
the quantitative impact of increased diﬀerencing interval is similar. Our
estimates indicate that the fraction of a shock that remains unsmoothed
increases by 20 %-points as the diﬀerencing interval increases from 1 to 5.
Asdrubali et al. (1996) estimate the increase to be 17 %-points. On the other
hand, we find a sharper increase in the importance of government smoothing
and a sharper decline in the importance of market based smoothing.
In one important respect does the county and regional results in tables
4 and 5 diﬀer. As the growth horizon increases, the estimate of βP (the
fraction of the shock smoothed by capital markets/ commuting) drops much
faster at the regional level. With k = 5, this estimate at regional level is less
than half the corresponding estimate at the county level. Given that the
long run analysis’ may be more reliable, this suggest that commuting may
indeed be an important mechanism in response to region-specific shocks.
Concentrating on the regional level analysis, it appears that the compar-
ison with the US study of Asdrubali et al. (1996) changes as the diﬀerencing
interval increases. When the diﬀerencing interval is 1 year, Norway stands
out with an extremely high degree of regional risk sharing and with capital
markets/ commuting as the most important channel. When the diﬀerencing
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interval is 5 years, Norway still comes out with a higher degree of risk sharing
than the US (80% versus 60%), but government smoothing is now twice as
important as the market based channels of smoothing.
7 Conclusions
We have estimated the degree and sources of regional risk sharing in Norway
over the period 1977-90. All our results indicate that there is a substantial
amount of cross-regional insurance taking place in Norway. Regardless of
aggregation level, estimation method or diﬀerencing length, less than 20 %
of a regional shock to output come out as unsmoothed.
We extend the analysis of Asdrubali et al. to take account of public
employment as a possible shock absorber. It turns out that this is indeed
an important channel for risk sharing, but not as important as capital mar-
kets/commuting for the annually diﬀerenced data. Due to possible measure-
ment errors, we do however rely more on our long run results. The pattern
here is that the market based channels of risk sharing (capital markets &
commuting and credit markets) decrease in importance as the diﬀerencing
interval increase while the ’policy’ channels (public employment and taxes
& transfers) become more important. At the regional level, the combined
smoothing of public employment and taxes & transfers are larger than the
total smoothing eﬀects of the market based channels, for 4 and 5 years dif-
ferencing intervals. This does also suggests that the central government
responds to shocks with a lag.
Finally, in our long run analysis (k = 3,4,5), it is a significant diﬀerence
between the county and the regional level regarding the fraction of a shock
absorbed by the capital markets/ commuting channel. At k = 5 for instance,
the size of the estimated βP at the regional level is less than half of the corre-
sponding estimate at the county level. This suggests to us that commuting
and cross-regional shopping is partly responsible for the extreme high values
of βP estimated at the county level.
In comparing our results with the US analysis of Asdrubali et al. (1996),
it is the last two to three columns in table 5 we find most reliable. The
picture here is that Norway has a much higher degree of regional risk sharing
than the US, and that government smoothing is more important in Norway.
It would be interesting to see in future research whether these results are
special for Norway or if they are valid for other European countries as well.
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8 Appendix
[Table A1 here]
[Table A2 here]
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Table 1: Basic cross-regional correlation coefficients, 1976-90. 
County c grp grp (private) 
Østfold 0.93 0.64 0.69 
Akershus 0.92 0.90 0.90 
Oslo 0.96 0.74 0.90 
Hedmark 0.98 0.86 0.93 
Oppland 0.97 0.91 0.91 
Buskerud 0.97 0.72 0.86 
Vestfold 0.97 0.65 0.76 
Telemark 0.96 0.31 0.28 
Aust Agder 0.94 0.86 0.87 
Vest Agder 0.97 0.58 0.49 
Rogaland 0.96 0.52 0.43 
Hordaland 0.96 0.86 0.86 
Sogn & Fj. 0.95 0.57 0.22 
Møre & R. 0.98 0.84 0.74 
Sør Trøndelag 0.97 0.71 0.58 
Nord Trøndelag 0.96 0.87 0.91 
Nordland 0.97 0.83 0.84 
Troms 0.97 0.80 0.56 
Finnmark 0.95 0.65 0.44 
Unweighted average 0.96 0.73 0.69 
 
 
 
Table 2: Unweighted averages of cross-regional correlation 
coefficients, 1977-90.  Min-max in parenthesis. 
 County level Regional level 
grpp 0.70 
(0.22 – 0.94) 
0.80 
(0.68 – 0.88) 
grp 0.67 
(0.10 – 0.89) 
0.75 
(0.63 – 0.88) 
ri 0.94 
(0.82 – 0.98) 
0.96 
(0.90 – 0.98) 
dri 0.96 
(0.86 – 0.99) 
0.97 
(0.93 – 0.99) 
c 0.95 
(0.89 – 0.98) 
0.97 
(0.96 – 0.98) 
 
Table 3: The ASY approach and the extended approach. 
OLS estimates with t-values in parentheses 
 ASY 
     County               Region 
Extended 
     County               Region 
Public employment   0.175 
(10.58) 
0.198 
(3.90) 
Capital markets/commuting 0.944 
(36.20) 
0.910 
(13.53) 
0.770 
(27.21) 
0.676 
(8.05) 
Taxes & transfers 0.023 
(1.84) 
0.058 
(1.85) 
0.025 
(2.38) 
0.082 
(3.10) 
Credit markets 0.031 
(0.85) 
0.123 
(1.79) 
0.020 
(0.63) 
0.061 
(0.98) 
Not smoothed 0.002 
(0.07) 
-0.091 
(-1.26) 
0.009 
(0.29) 
-0.017 
(-0.27) 
 
 
 
Table 4: Varying the frequency of the data, county level 
OLS estimates with t-values in parentheses 
 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 
Public employment 0.175 
(10.58) 
0.182 
(11.90) 
0.194 
(12.42) 
0.210 
(12.08) 
0.229 
(12.78) 
Capital markets/commuting 0.770 
(27.21) 
0.738 
(23.93) 
0.645 
(19.78) 
0.548 
(15.10) 
0.522 
(14.09) 
Taxes & transfers 0.025 
(2.38) 
0.052 
(4.03) 
0.099 
(6.75) 
0.137 
(8.51) 
0.148 
(8.71) 
Credit markets 0.020 
(0.63) 
-0.003 
(-0.08) 
-0.029 
(-0.81) 
-0.049 
(-1.17) 
-0.087 
(-1.96) 
Not smoothed 0.009 
(0.29) 
0.031 
(0.93) 
0.091 
(2.47) 
0.154 
(3.71) 
0.188 
(4.32) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Varying the frequency of the data, regional level. 
OLS estimates with t-values in parentheses 
 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 
Public employment 0.198 
(3.90) 
0.150 
(3.18) 
0.216 
(4.60) 
0.217 
(4.23) 
0.250 
(4.48) 
Capital markets/commuting 0.676 
(8.05) 
0.686 
(7.82) 
0.475 
(6.45) 
0.317 
(4.20) 
0.233 
(2.95) 
Taxes & transfers 0.082 
(3.10) 
0.124 
(3.95) 
0.206 
(6.19) 
0.261 
(7.73) 
0.274 
(7.09) 
Credit markets 0.061 
(0.98) 
0.036 
(0.54) 
0.019 
(0.26) 
0.074 
(0.85) 
0.047 
(0.47) 
Not smoothed -0.017 
(-0.27) 
0.004 
(0.62) 
0.085 
(1.12) 
0.131 
(1.47) 
0.195 
(2.00) 
 
 
 
Table A1: Reestimating table 3 using the method of Asdrubali et al. (1996) 
t-values in parentheses 
 ASY 
County               Region 
Extended 
County               Region 
Public employment   0.180 
(17.13) 
0.181 
(5.05) 
Capital markets/commuting 0.956 
(42.30) 
0.934 
(16.78) 
0.767 
(32.49) 
0.697 
(10.40) 
Taxes & transfers 0.016 
(1.48) 
0.035 
(1.36) 
0.022 
(2.42) 
0.065 
(2.93) 
Credit markets 0.037 
(1.16) 
0.091 
(1.80) 
0.026 
(0.92) 
0.037 
(0.83) 
Not smoothed -0.009 
(-0.27) 
-0.061 
(-1.06) 
0.005 
(0.16) 
0.020 
(0.38) 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Reestimating table 3 using the method of Mélitz and Zumer (1999) 
t-values in parentheses 
 ASY 
County               Region 
Extended 
County               Region 
Public employment   0.218 
(12.61) 
0.262 
(6.95) 
Capital markets/commuting 1.041 
(20.90) 
1.165 
(11.20) 
1.059 
(20.45) 
1.185 
(11.40) 
Taxes & transfers 0.027 
(0.70) 
0.008 
(0.09) 
0.029 
(0.76) 
0.032 
(0.34) 
Credit markets -0.102 
(-2.68) 
-0.230 
(-2.78) 
-0.349 
(-7.92) 
-0.271 
(-3.28) 
Not smoothed 0.034 0.057 0.044 0.053 
 
 
 
